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Abstract  
Men and women’s labor market outcomes differ along pay, promotion and competitiveness. This paper 
contributes by uncovering results in a related unexplored field using unique data on individual wage 
bargaining. We find striking gender differences. Women, like men, also bargain, but they submit lower 
wage bids and are offered lower wages than men. The adjusted gender wage gap is lower with posted-
wage jobs than with individual bargaining, although less is ascribable to the term associated with 
discrimination. Both women and men use self-promoting, or competitive bargaining strategies, but 
women self-promote at lower levels. Employers reward self-promotion but the larger the self-promotion, 
the larger is the gender gap in bargaining success. Women therefore lack the incentives to self-promote, 
which helps to explain the gender disparities.  
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1 Introduction 
The labor market outcomes of men and women differ along a variety of dimensions. Even after 
controlling for a broad range of demographic and background characteristics, women earn 
significantly less than men do (see e.g. Altonji and Black 2000; Blau & Kahn, 2003, for an 
international comparison; Edin & Richardson, 2002, and Albrecht et al, 2003, for Sweden
1). 
Women are also less likely to have top-ranking positions (Bertrand & Hallock, 2001) and to have 
lower career mobility (Granqvist & Persson, 1999).  
Standard economic explanations for such occupational differences include preferences, 
discrimination and ability. Common explanations for women having preferences different from 
men, and thereby choosing to enter low-paying jobs, often emphasize women’s role in the 
family, which affects their human capital investment and career choices. Another common 
explanation is discrimination or anticipated discrimination limiting women’s labor market 
opportunities. Finally, some argue that men and women differ along unobservable dimensions of 
skills, where these unobservable differences develop into disparate labor outcomes.  
In this paper, several of these issues are addressed by investigating gender differences on 
the labor market from a new perspective; that of individual wage bargaining. In particular, we 
examine whether men and women differ in the bargaining strategies they use and whether the 
ensuing bargaining success, or the pay-off to a strategy, differs by gender.   
Empirical evidence on gender differences in real wage bargaining is limited.
2 The study 
therefore contributes by uncovering results in an unexplored field.
3 Nonetheless, individual 
                                                           
1 As in most countries, the average raw gender wage gap in Sweden has narrowed since the 1960s. In 1968 the 
average raw gender wage gap was almost 30 percent while the equivalent for 1991 was 20 percent. However, since 
1991 the raw gender wage gap has increased slightly (Albrecht et al, 2003). These developments are mainly driven 
by corresponding developments in the overall wage distribution (Edin & Richardsson, 2002). 
2 One important exception is Babcock (2003) who provides interesting results and anecdotes. 
3 Many studies, theoretical as well as empirical, have focused on the bargaining power of unions. When it comes to 
post-employment wage bargaining there is a vast amount of literature, especially in the field of personnel economics 
and with particular emphasis on the employers’ concerns.   3
bargaining over wages is one of the main components of the interaction in the labor market. If 
gender differences in bargaining strategies exists and the ensuing outcomes differ, it may suggest 
an explanation to why women are less represented in competitive working environments, less 
represented in high–paying jobs, or are less likely to compete for promotion.  
The data explored is a unique dataset from two Swedish surveys conducted in 1999 and 
2000, which include recent graduates within the social sciences. The data contains of a 
homogenous population where all are young graduates with short labor market careers. This 
limits issues of selection due to career interruptions for family concerns, job changes, or 
participation selection. In addition, the surveys incorporate important control variables for 
differences in labor market opportunities, outside options and individual attributes.  
In the survey, respondents were asked to report whether they were asked to state an 
explicit wage bid at the time of application for the initial job they got within their field of major, 
and if so, the level of the wage bid. Moreover, they were asked to state the offered wage, or in 
this case, the equivalent wage they accepted. Some respondents reported not being asked about a 
wage bid, and hence are assumed to have applied for a job with posted wages. The data thus 
allows for comparisons using the posted wage group as a control group.   
In order to establish whether or not there are gender differences in bargaining and in 
bargaining outcomes, we focus on four issues. The first issue analyzed is whether there are 
gender differences in the propensity to choose to apply for a job with wage bargaining as a part 
of the application process, compared to choosing a job with a posted wage. Previous studies have 
found that women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations (Babcock & Laschever 2003; 
Babcock et al 2006). Recent experimental research has also shown that women choose 
competitive pay-offs to a lesser extent than men, (Datta Gupta et al, 2006; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2005). Women may additionally not choose to bargain if they are more risk averse   4
than men, as suggested by some research (e.g. Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Powell & Ansic, 
1997; Sundén & Surette, 1998).  In Datta Gupta et al (2006) one explanation to women not 
choosing a competitive pay-off is a higher risk-aversion.  
The second issue investigated is whether men and women submit different wage bids. 
Women may submit lower wages than men do if they face different labor markets, and/or if they 
have different outside options. Women could face a monopsonistic labor market, a higher level 
of family responsibilities, or they may be restricted in choosing a job due to a husband-and-wife 
coordination of job locations, all causing a downward pressure on female wage bids. Yet, 
considering that the average age for women in Sweden at their first marriage was 29.9 in 1998 
and 30.4 in 1999, and the equivalent for men was 32.4 and 32.9 (Statistics Sweden, 2000), such 
considerations should not be too predominant for the individuals in the sample where women 
(men) are 27 (28) years on average. Likewise, the average age for females having their first child 
in Sweden was approximately 28.5 years in both 1999 and 2000 (Statistics Sweden, 2000). 
Therefore, given the relatively high age, along with Sweden having generous public parental 
child-care benefits (with a share earmarked for the father), the choice of jobs should not be too 
different between men and women in the sample.         
Third, we explore the use of self-promoting bargaining strategies. Assume that employers 
believe the wage bid reveals information on a personal attribute of the applicant, which is not 
observable. The extent of overbidding a similar applicant, that is, submitting a higher wage bid 
than an applicant with identical observable attributes who bargain for the same type of job, or 
underbidding a similar applicant, then reveals the individual’s evaluation of these personal 
attributes. Overbidding could thus be considered as a self-promoting strategy or competitive 
strategy though assumed to be upperly bounded by a loss in credibility, and thereby by the loss 
of the job opportunity.    5
The self-promoting strategy is assumed to reflect a self-assessed evaluation of the 
applicant’s unobservable productivity. A lower value than a similar applicant, and to some extent 
a higher value, would thus signal a lower, or higher, unobservable productivity. This is supported 
by empirical evidence suggesting that underbidding (and to some extent overbidding) market 
wages have been interpreted to be signals of lower (higher) productivity, (see Agell & Lundborg, 
1995 and 2003, for survey evidence; and Fehr & Falk, 1999, for experimental evidence). 
Alternatively, a self-promoting strategy could reveal preferences on competitiveness or be taken 
to reveal preferences on risk-taking such that high-risk takers are those who also dare to overbid 
more.       
Following sociological research we may expect gender differences in employing such 
strategies. A well-documented tendency in sociological research (see Smith & Powell, 1990, for 
further references) is that people often “self-enhance”; they positively differentiate between their 
own characteristics or behaviors relative to the same characteristics and behaviors in other 
people.
4 According to this line of research men tend to self-enhance to a greater extent than 
women do. Therefore men may have a higher estimation of their personal ability and thus would 
self-promote or overbid to a larger extent.
5  
  An alternative explanation is that men and women could be treated differently if they 
bargain. Bowles (2005) suggests that bargaining poses a challenge for women because it calls for 
a type of dominative masculine behavior (competitive assertion of one’s self-interest) that 
                                                           
4 Another explanation could of course be that men and women have an objective difference in ability, such that 
women have worse university performance and/or lower grades. As a matter of fact, the empirical evidence suggests 
the opposite. In a report on all Swedish university graduates for 1995/1996, it is found that women had a higher 
performance score (number of credits achieved per semester) of 85 percent while the equivalent for men were 80 
percent. If only looking at the social science majors, the gender difference was 6 percent. Moreover, 18 percent of 
the women compared to 12 percent of the men were found in the upper end of the high-school grade distribution, 
with grade averages higher than 4.0 (on a scale between 1.0 to 5.0), Statistics Sweden and the National Board for 
Higher Education (1998).   
5 Paralleling these findings regarding a difference in subjective ability rating, females appear to expect less in terms 
of wage gains due to possession of a college degree (Brunello et al, 2004). Female students expect both significantly   6
contradicts the prescriptive norms of feminine behavior. The study also found that women who 
choose to bargain where evaluated as less nice and inappropriately demanding (but not as less 
competent), while this was only true for males if bargaining with a male evaluator.     
Fourth, and finally, we want to assess if men and women are equally successful given the 
same self-promoting strategy, all observable characteristics equal. Psychological literature has 
found that women tend to be more cooperative in bargaining than men (see Walters et al, 1998, 
for a meta-analysis on the issue), although the difference is slight. If women are more 
cooperative either by nature or through socialization, or if they are perceived as being more 
cooperative, then they may not be equally rewarded, even for the same bargaining strategy. 
Holm (2000) also finds that both men and women tended to behave significantly more 
“hawkishly” (or non-cooperatively) towards women when bargaining, although this kind of 
discrimination against women worked as a coordination device that boosted the earnings of both 
sexes.
6 
Agell & Bennmarker (2002) also found that firms with a large share of female employees 
were less likely to believe that employees, who were unhappy about their pay, would respond by 
reducing their own efforts. Thus, even if women would enjoy a lower return from their 
bargaining, and would thus be less successful, employers may feel they will not respond by 
reducing their efforts to the same extent that men would.
7  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
lower starting salaries after graduation and believe their prospects to be worse, even if they rank themselves as 
highly as the equivalent male rates himself (see also Betts 1996). 
6 Hultin & Szulkin (1999) also found that gender wage differentials are affected by the gender composition of an 
establishment’s managerial staff. The negative effect on women’s wages due to a high male representation among 
managers and supervisors was three times as strong within organizations with a highly decentralized wage-setting 
process than it was for females in general. The data in this paper, however, reveals no information on the sex of the 
employer.  
7 In an efficiency-wage experiment, Schwieren (2002) however, found that the average wage asked for by men and 
women was the equivalent but that women were offered lower wages after bargaining. Moreover, men reciprocated 
by making more effort for high wage offers than women did, but this was mainly a consequence of women not being 
offered wages in the same range.     7
The empirical analysis of the four issues reveals striking findings. We first establish that 
women actually choose a job where bargaining is involved to the same extent as men do. This 
result thus differ from previous findings on women being more prone to avoid situations with 
competitive pay-offs. Second, women consistently submit lower wage bids than men do, also 
when controlling for important job and individual attributes.  
Third, as found by many previous studies, women receive lower wages than men do. 
Interestingly, although wages are higher for both men and women who have bargained, ex post, 
bargaining for wages results in a higher unadjusted gender wage gap by one percentage point, 
with the gap being 0.95 for those applying for posted wage and 0.94 for those who chose to 
bargain. Also after adjusting the wage gap to account for important job and individual attributes, 
the difference between the groups remain at one percentage point. Yet, in a wage-decomposition 
(Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), we find that the term commonly ascribed to discrimination 
explains less among those who bargained, 55 percent of the gender wage gap, while for those 
who chose posted wages, the similar term explain 68 percent of the wage gap. Thus, a failure to 
acknowledge individual wage bargaining may overestimate the gender wage gap typically 
ascribed to wage discrimination. 
The use of self-promoting strategies also differs by gender. Women do not necessarily 
use self-promoting strategies less often than similar men do, but they do so at lower levels. 
Restricting the sample into those who strictly overbid a similar candidate, women overbid by 9.4 
percent, compared to men who overbid by 12.9 percent, on average.  
In general, self-promoting strategies are rewarded by employers. Overbidding has a 
positive effect on the bargaining success, that is, the amount additionally offered to the applicant 
relative to a similar applicant. Women, however, receive a lower pay-off relative to men from the 
same self-promoting strategy. The results may parallel the findings on reciprocal wage-setting   8
found in Agell & Bennmarker (2002). But quantile regression estimates reveal that gender 
differences do not exist in the 25
th quantile of bargaining success, and that it is in particular in the 
75
th quantile where gender differences are largest. Consequently, in a bargaining situation where 
the scope for improving the wage offer by a self-promoting strategy is high, women are less 
successful than men are from being self-promoting.  
In summary, the lower pay-off to overbidding thus creates weaker incentives for women 
to employ self-promoting strategies. Even though women choose to self-promote, their strategies 
are either considered as less credible compared to similar males’ strategies, or there is a glass-
ceiling on the value of a self-promoting or competitive strategy for women. Hence the result may 
explain why women refrain from entering competitive working environments, or are less 
represented in high-paying jobs.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents the 
empirical model and Section 4 the results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2 Data 
The data set is derived from two surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 by Jusek,
8 a Swedish trade 
union for white-collar workers. The individuals in the surveys were university graduates as at 
September 1997-1998 and September 1998-1999 who had received at least three years university 
education. They should further have majored in one of five fields: law, business administration 
and economics, computer and systems science, personnel management or social science. Only 
individuals who fulfill the above requirement and who were born later than 1964 are included in 
                                                           
8 The Swedish Association of Graduates in Law, Business Administration and Economics, Computer and Systems 
Science, Personnel Management and Social Sciences.   9
the survey sample.
9 The data set includes 1911 individuals from the 1999 survey and 2054 from 
the 2000 survey.  
 Two wage variables are used in the analysis.
10 The first is the applicant’s wage bid, that 
is, the wage asked for if employment were to occur (to the employer they accepted working for). 
The second wage variable is the offered wage (or starting salary) at the time when employment 
begins. Both these are given as monthly gross wages.
11 For those who work part time the survey 
explicitly states that the wage should be converted into a full-time monthly gross wage.  
For the analysis of individuals who have stated an explicit wage bid the number of 
observations is reduced to 2112 for the pooled sample, with 1022 from 1999 and 1090 from 
2000. In the pooled sample there are 57 percent women and 43 percent men.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the wage data. The first noteworthy finding is 
that, dividing the sample into those who chose jobs where wage bargaining was a part of the 
application process, we find that man and women equally likely to choose such jobs. The share 
of women who choose jobs with bargaining is 54 percent and the equivalent for men is 53 
percent with any statistically significant difference rejected in a t test. This is particularly 
interesting as Babcock & Laschever (2003) find that only 7 percent of women compared to 57 
percent of men tried to improve their initial wage offer by negotiation. Moreover, in Gneezy et al 
                                                           
9 The response rate for the 1999 survey was 63 percent of the total of 4000 graduates between September 1997 and 
September 1998, and in the 2000 survey the response rate was 63 percent out of 4500 graduates between September 
1998 and September 1999.  
10 A third wage measure, the current wage, is also available in the survey. As this measure was given directly after 
the questions on the wage bid and the offered wage, the error of reporting the offered wage as the current wage 
should be minimized.   
11 The gross monthly wages are used rather than an hourly wage measure. Even though the surveys include 
information on hours worked per week, the measure is ambiguous due to the formulation of the question, whereby 
the respondents cannot mark up exactly 40 hours worked per week. Either they must choose “work less than 40 
hours” or “41-45 hours per week”. The exclusion of the alternative ‘exactly 40 hours’ may thus have meant that 
respondents misclassified their working hours. As this is the only measure of part-time work available in the data, 
individuals who work part time will be treated as if they work full time. In addition, individuals who have stated a 
wage bid below SEK 10 000 are excluded (3 individuals), since the wage bid is more likely to refer to part-time than 
to full-time employment.   10
(2003) & Datta Gupta et al (2006) it is found that women choose a competitive pay-off to a 
lower extent than women do.  
The second noteworthy finding is that women on average submit lower wage bids. The 
average wage bid for the pooled sample in gross monthly wages for women is SEK 18 215 (appr 
US $ 2600), while the equivalent for men is SEK 19 228 (appr US $ 2750). Thus the unadjusted 
relative wage bid for women is approximately 94.7 percent of the same bid for men, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 99 percent level. Furthermore, men have a larger 
spread in their wage bids. These gender differences in wage bidding also apply for both years 
separately. 
The third finding is that offered wages are also lower for women on average. For men, 
the average offered wage is SEK 18 628 (appr US $ 2665), while for women it is SEK 17 517 
(appr US $ 2502), with a statistically significant difference at the 99 percent level. The 
unadjusted relative wage offer for women is thus approximately 94.0 percent.  
Comparing these findings with those who chose jobs with posted wages, we find a 
similar difference in men’s and women’s wage offers with a statistically significant difference. 
However, the gender wage gap for applicants to jobs with posted wages is lower. Consequently 
the preliminary results point toward an increase in the gender wage gap following individual 
wage bargaining.  
Nonetheless, wage offers are considerably higher both for men and women who chose to 
individually bargain over their wages compared to those choosing posted wage offers. Between 
men who bargained and men who did not, wage offers are significantly higher, also statistically, 
for the former group. The same result is found within the female group. Hence, although gender 
wage differentials are higher within the group who bargained, as compared with those who did 
not, wages are considerably higher in the former group. Thus similar to Datta Gupta et al (2006)   11
we find that women are more likely to choose a competitive pay when the economic incentives 
are higher. However, as the finding refers to the unadjusted wage differentials, several other 
factors could explain the higher wages subsequent to bargaining and the increasing gender wage 
differentials.  
 
3 Empirical Model 
3.1. Adjusted Wage Gaps 
To establish whether differences in the gender wage gap prevail if we adjust for crucial wage-
generating characteristics a standard Mincer wage model is estimated where:  
+ + + + + + = SECTOR AGE EXPERI MAJOR FEMALE W
OFF
i 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β δ  
  i S METRO TRAINEE CONTRACT υ β β β β + + + + + 2000 9 8 7 6    [1]. 
i MAJOR represents the different fields of major to indicate the highest educational level 
completed by the applicant. Previous job experience,  i EXPERI , is also included as job 
experience may increase productivity. In both of the surveys subjects were able to indicate 
whether they had had any employment between graduation and the current position, thus 
covering postgraduate work only. In the 2000 survey respondents could also indicate whether or 
not their work was “qualified” or “unqualified” (with no further interpretation given in the 
survey). In the pooled sample only those who marked qualified experience are included in the 
category qualified work experience, while those with any work experience are pooled with those 
who marked unqualified work experience. Note that since the type of job experience cannot be 
distinguished, qualified work experience will be underestimated.  
To account for any additional labor market experience, the age,  i AGE , of the respondent 
is included. This measure is intended to capture not any specific job-market experience but   12
experience in other job-related aspects, dimensions that are thought to increase productivity. As 
there is no information on pre-graduation work experience, the variable age may capture some of 
this effect.  
Job- and employer-related characteristics are also included to control for differences in 
market opportunities. First, wages may differ between job sectors,  i SECTOR , and hence dummy 
variables are included to control for applying to the private, governmental or municipal sector.
12 
Furthermore, individuals with temporary employment contracts (trial period, project basis or 
substitute contracts),  i CONTRACT , are separated from individuals with permanent employment 
contracts. As some individuals have applied for trainee positions, a dummy variable has been 
added,  i TRAINEE . Because a job location in a metropolitan area could represent a more flexible 
labor market and thereby increase the bargaining power of the applicant we distinguish between 
a job location in a metropolitan and non-metropolitan area,  i METRO . To account for any year or 
survey effects a survey dummy,  i S2000  is included. Finally  i υ  is the error component, assumed 
to fulfill the usual criteria of independence. 
To analyze the adjusted wage gap in wage bids, a similar Mincer model to equation (1) 
for the wage bids is estimated, with an additional proxy for the applicant’s outside option. The 
estimated model is then:  
+ + + + + + = SECTOR AGE EXPERI MAJOR FEMALE W
BID
i 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β δ   
  i TIME SEARCH S METRO TRAINEE CONTRACT ε β β β β β + + + + + + 10 9 8 7 6 2000 [2] 
                                                           
12 Some individuals have reported working in a sector denoted “other” and are dropped (45 individuals) since the 
survey lacks any information as to what is defined as “other”. Individuals working outside Sweden are also dropped 
(25 working in Nordic countries, 37 in other parts of Europe and 12 outside Europe) along with those being self-
employed (14 individuals), or who participate in labor market programs (67 individuals).   13
One proxy for outside option is the time spent on searching for the job,  i SEARCHTIME . 
Assuming unobservable productivity is positively correlated with the probability of getting a job, 
wage bids would decline with the time spent searching for a job.
13  
Another measure of the outside option consists of the number of jobs applied for prior to 
accepting the current employment,  i S APPLIEDJOB . Assume job utility is higher for the more 
able applicants, and therefore abler applicants would need to search for fewer jobs than an 
equivalent applicant with lower unobserved ability would have to. This variable is however only 
available for the 1999 survey. 
Table 2 displays the summary statistics for the control variables. There are some gender 
differences worth noting. Men and women have majored in different fields, with more women 
among those majoring in social sciences and personnel management, whereas more men major in 
the field of computer and system science.
 14 The same difference is found for those who chose a 
posted wage job. Further, more men are employed in the private sector and they are older on 
average than the women.
15 Men are also more strongly represented in the group having no search 
time
16, while women are more often found in the groups who searched for more than six months 
before finding (or accepting) their current jobs. 
                                                           
13 However, time spent in searching for the job may also have a contrary effect. Assuming that individuals with 
more time to search will also learn more about how to find a good job-match, then we could find a positive effect on 
wage bids depending on the time spent in job search. 
14 Women have noted that they work less than 40 hours per week to a greater extent than men, see footnote 16. As 
regards those who chose to bargain (posted wages), 21 (18) percent of the women work part time while the 
equivalent for men is 14 (12) percent. Yet, given the age of the individuals included in the sample, it is reasonable to 
assume few applied for part-time work as the average age for females having their first child in Sweden is 
approximately 28 years in both 1999 and 2000 (Statistics Sweden, 2000). A t-test, moreover, reveals that the share 
of women over 28 years is smaller than the share of over 28 men in the group which has noted “work less than 40 
hours”. The difference is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
15 The higher average age among men may be explained by the compulsory military service for young men in 
Sweden.  
16 Note that the group no search time includes (i) individuals who got the job before graduation, (ii) those who 
returned to a previous employer from the time before their university studies, or (iii) those who found their jobs 
within a month of graduation.   14
There are also some differences between the groups who applied for a job requiring wage 
bargaining and those who applied for jobs with posted wages. Gender differences between these 
groups, however, are small. This last could then be taken as evidence that there are no particular 
selection effects along gender lines. 
 
3.2. Self-promoting Bargaining Strategies and Bargaining Success 
To assess the extent to which applicants overbid, or underbid, similar applicants a measure which 
relates the wage bid to a “reference wage bid” the employer may have expected given the 
applicants characteristics is developed. The reference wage is derived from regressing the wage 
bid according to equation [2] and from this then predict a “market wage bid” for every applicant 
who chose to bargain over their wages,  i BID PREDMARKET . The measure of overbidding is 






OVERBID =       [ 3 ] .  
When the measure,  i OVERBID  is above 1, the applicant has bid a wage higher than a similar 
applicant would, given the same characteristics. When it is below 1 the applicant has bid a wage 
lower than a similar applicant would, in general, given the same characteristics. 
Similarly, we develop a measure which captures the bargaining outcome or bargaining 
success, relative to what the applicant may have expected given the job and applicant 
characteristics.  Likewise, the actual wage offer is compared to a calculated “reference wage 
offer” derived by estimating equation [1] for the whole sample and from this predict a “market 
wage offer” for each applicant who chose to bargain over their wage,  i OFFER PREDMARKET . 





S BARGSUCCES =      [4]. 
When the measure is above 1 (below 1) the applicant received an offer higher (lower) than that 
predicted by his or her wage- generating characteristics or by the job attributes.  
We allow for two different specifications of the reference wage offer and wage bids. In a 
first specification a gender dummy is not included when estimating the reference wages. The 
reference wages are thereby set according to what is expected of a similar candidate regardless of 
gender. In a second specification the gender dummy is included to take into account that men 
and women may be differently valued in the market (the commonly found negative wage 
premium for women) and therefore do not serve as substitutes for a similar candidate. Note that 
with the first specification, women’s overbidding is undervalued if men and women do not 
appear as substitutes to the employer.  
Finally we want to elicit the differences in the pay-off from a self-promoting bargaining 
strategy. To measure the pay-off we regress the level of overbidding on the bargaining outcome, 
i S BARGSUCCES , such that: 
i FEMob i ob F i OVERBID FEM OVERBID FEM S BARGSUCCES ε β β β α + + + + = *  [5]. 
The  ob β  measures the effect of overbidding on the bargaining success, i.e. the pay-off at 
different levels of overbidding, relative to a similar applicant. Notice that  ob β can capture the 
pay-off to unobservable ability, preferences for risk-taking or competitiveness. The female 
dummy,  FEM , and interaction effects,  OVERBID FEM * are included to compare bargaining 
outcome differences between men and women.       
To allow for a better characterization of the conditional distribution of the bargaining 
success a quantile regression method is used. Since if overbidding influence the conditional 
distribution of the bargaining success other than at the mean, a quantile regression model constitutes a superior way of describing the whole distribution compared to OLS, see 
Koenker and Hallok (2001). Note that standard errors are obtained by bootstrap methods. OLS 
estimates are also included for comparison. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 The Mincer Model for the Wage Bids and Wage Offers 
The results for the Mincer wage model for the wage bid model are reported in Table III, column 
1 and 2. What the estimated model first reveals is that women submit lower wage bids than men 
do, also after controlling for a broad range of factors. The difference is approximately 3 percent, 
or between 2.9 -3.5 percent depending upon the number of controls. The control variables all 
have the expected signs, and are apart from being a trainee, or not, statistically significant.
17  
The results for the offered wage are reported in Table III, column 3-5. The third column 
refers to findings based on the total sample while the fourth and fifth refers to a division of the 
sample into those choosing a job involving bargaining and those choosing a job with posted 
wage offers.  
As in many previous studies on the gender wage gap we find that women are offered 
lower wages, even when education, experience, age and other work-specific characteristics are 
controlled for. The gender dummy reveals an average effect of 2.7 percent lower offered wages 
for women. Dividing the sample, we obtain a striking finding that the gender difference in 
offered wages is higher for those who chose to bargain relative to those with posted-wage jobs, 
3.2 percent versus 2.6 percent, and that the difference is higher than that for the wage bids, 2.9 
                                                           
17 There are two coefficients worth noting. First, only if the applicant has searched for more than nine months is 
there a positive effect on wage bids, suggesting that a long search time could have an informational value on the job-
match quality. One possible explanation could however be that respondents misclassified their search time. Within 
this group, 27 percent have had a job for more than six moths prior to the current one, in comparison to 11 percent 
for the whole sample. However, the correlation between postgraduate work experience and searching for more than   17
percent. Thus there is a gender difference not only in bargaining but also an even stronger one in 
the post-bargaining outcome.  
To further assess the extent to which the adjusted wage gap is explained by gender-
specific differences in characteristics, or to which these characteristics are differently priced, the 
widely employed method of decomposition suggested by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) is 
used (for a thorough explanation see Appendix A). In Appendix Table I we present the OLS 
estimates of equation [2] separated by gender and bargaining. The results of the wage 
decomposition are displayed in Table 4. To what extent would the gap then decrease, if women’s 
characteristics were the same as men’s? The second term (ii) indicate that the gap would 
decrease by 2.7 percentage points for those choosing a job with wage bargaining and by 1.6 
percentage points for those choosing a posted wage-job, if women had the same characteristics 
as men. This resembles results found in other papers using Swedish data (see e.g. Edin & 
Richardson, 2001).  
The term commonly associated with discrimination then accounts for 55 percent of the 
wage gap for those who bargained and 68 percent for those with posted wages. Hence, even 
though the gap is larger for women in the former group, less of it can be ascribed to 
discrimination. What this finding indicates is that earlier studies which measure gender wage 
differentials on a basis of offered wages and without knowing whether the offered wage is a 
result of individual wage bargaining behavior or not, may actually have overestimated the 
unexplained share or the part commonly ascribed to discrimination. 
4.2. Self-promoting Bargaining Strategies and the Bargaining Success 
The summary statistics of the measure of overbidding are given in Table 5. The first finding is 
that women overbid the reference wage less often than men do and if they do, they overbid by a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 months is no greater than 0.19 for unqualified work and 0.28 for qualified work experience. Second, the number of   18
smaller amount. In particular, on average, a woman who strictly overbids a similar candidate, 
man or woman, overbids with 9 percent, while men do so by 13 percent on average. If we instead 
compare the wage bid to a reference wage which takes the gender into account, then women 
overbid a similar candidate to a larger extent than men do and by a higher amount, on average. 
This comes from the fact that when the reference wage takes the gender into account, then the 
reference wage for a female applicant is significantly lower than for a male applicant (due to the 
significant negative gender dummy in the references wage regression). Therefore more women 
have a ratio above 1. But when we restrict the sample into those who strictly overbid a similar 
candidate, women overbid by a smaller amount, 9.4 percent, compared to men who overbid by 
12.9 percent on average. Hence also when taking the negative gender premium into account, 
women use self-promoting strategies to a lesser extent. Looking at the level of underbidding, we 
find the opposite pattern. If men underbid a similar applicant, then he underbids by a higher level 
than women do, although the difference is not so large. 
Figure 1 illustrates our findings well. In Figure 1 the conditional distributions of 
overbidding using gender adjusted reference wages, for men and women is depicted. We can 
then see that men’s distribution is laying to the right of the female distribution suggesting that 
they have a higher level of overbidding similar applicants, especially for high levels of 
overbidding.  
Table 6 reports the results from the estimations of equation [5], when not taking the 
female dummy into account. A comparison of the OLS estimates and the median, or 50
th, 
quantile estimates provides very similar results suggesting that women obtain lower bargaining 
pay-off when self-promoting or overbidding a similar candidate. For example, assume an 
applicant decides to overbid a similar applicant by 20 percent instead of 10 percent. If the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
jobs applied for has a clearly negative effect on the wage bid, also when the length of search is controlled for.      19
applicant is a woman this strategy is rewarded by 8.9 percentage points higher offered wage, 
while the equivalent for a male is 9.4 percentage points.   
 
Figure 1 The Conditional Distribution of Overbidding for men (dashed line) and women (filled 
line).   
 
Comparing the effect of overbidding at different quantiles of the bargaining success, we 
first note that the effect is much larger in the 75
th quantile compared to, in particular, the 25
th 
quantile. Assuming a similar example to the one above, a woman who is in the 75
th quantile of 
the bargaining success receives as a counter-offer which is 9.6 percentage points higher while the 
equivalent for a male is 10.5 percentage points. In Figure 2 predicted differences of overbidding 
in the highest quantile compared to the lowest quantile of bargaining success is shown. Note that 
these differences are all significant at the 99 percent level. In sum, the estimated relationship first 












distribution of offered wages is narrower among similar applicants, i.e. in the 25
th quantile. 
Second, women do relatively worse when the distribution of offered wages among similar 
applicants is wider, hence where there is more scope for individual wage bargaining.  
 
Figure 2  The predicted difference from overbidding in the 75
th quantile relative to overbidding 
in the 25
th quantile for men (dashed line) and women (solid line) separately.   
 
In Table 7 we report the equivalent estimates controlling for the fact that men and women 
are not evaluated as perfect substitutes on average by employers. The results suggest a similar 
relationship, also when this effect is taken into account. Finally in Table 8, we report separate 
estimates for men and women. Again we find the pay-off difference between men and women to 
be accentuated the larger the scope for individual wage bargaining.  
This gender difference in pay-off in wage bargaining may first reflect the gender 
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a lower return from their bargaining, and are thus less successful, employers may feel they will 
not respond by reducing their efforts to the same extent that men would.  
Alternatively, the result could suggest that women come up against a “glass ceiling” 
when the scope for bargaining, and the use of self-promoting bargaining strategies is large 
despite having the same wage-generating characteristics needed. This result could suggest that 
employers are more discriminatory with a more wide spread wage distribution. Assuming that in 
higher-paying jobs or in high-profile jobs, employers allow for larger wage distributions then the 
results may also then parallel the results found in Albrecht et al (2003), where in Swedish wage 
data the gender log wage gap increases throughout the wage distribution, and actually accelerates 
at the upper end of the distribution. Likewise, if the level of the wage bid is seen as a signal of 
unobservable productivity, the finding may suggest that employers find women’s signals to be 
less credible.  
Consequently, if women are aware of the lower marginal gain from increasing their 
relative wage bid, the incentive to overbid in bargaining declines relative to men’s. Thus we 
would find that women do not ask for higher wages relative to similar applicants, in particular 
the larger the scope for bargaining, resulting in them finding themselves in a vicious circle, such 
that if they do not ask for higher wages they will not be given them. Hence incentives for self-
promoting bargaining strategies could be an explanation for the finding that female wage bids are 
lower.   
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Men and women’s choices and outcomes in the labor market differ along many dimensions. 
Differences in bargaining strategies may capture many of these disparities. For example, the use   22
of self-promoting strategies may be necessary to influence the probability to be promoted. 
Alternatively they may be necessary when applying for a better paid job. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that gender differences do exist in 
both wage bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes. It is found that women both ask for 
lower wages and receive lower counter-offers from employers. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of controls for individual-specific and employer-specific characteristics.  
  Another finding here is that if wage bargaining is acknowledged when explaining the 
wage offer gender gap, the unexplained part of the gap is reduced. This suggests that if gender 
differences are neglected in wage bargaining, the term commonly attributed to discrimination in 
wage decompositions may be overestimated. Instead, it may be the gender differences in wage 
bargaining that reflect discrimination.  
Gender differences were found in the use of self-promoting strategies. Women self-
promoted less. First, if this arises due to self-perceived ability differences or self-enhancement, 
then gender wage differentials may be exacerbated by individual wage bargaining more than if 
the employer uses wage-offer posting. Second, if as suggested by this study the economic 
incentives are weaker for women then women may decide to choose occupations where self-
promotion or competition is less likely to be important. 
As this study is unique in its kind, the results regarding individual wage bargaining 
differences are striking but yet primary. Therefore, in view of the findings in this paper, a 
stronger focus on bargaining behavior even when assessing the different outcomes for men and 
women in the labor market, is a useful direction for future research. 
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WAGE BID (SEK)  19 312***  18 196  0.942      
  (3 288.5)  (2 663.9)         
ln. WAGE BID   9.85***  9.80         
WAGE OFFER (SEK)  18 628***
a  17 517
 a  0.938 16 925***  16 047  0.948
  (3 311.1)  (2560.2)    (2 964.1)  (2 337.6)   
ln. WAGE OFFER  9.82***  9.76    9.72***  9.67   
No of Obs  901  1222    812  1030   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. ‡ “B” refers to those choosing a job involving 
individual wage bargaining and “PW” refers to those choosing a job with a posted wage. ***/**/* denote 
statistical gender differences at the 1/5/10 percent levels respectively in a t-test of equal variance. a/b/c 
denote statistical difference between bargainers and non-bargainers at the 1/5/10 percent levels 
respectively.    28
 
 
TABLE 2 SUMMARY STATISTICS ON SELECTED CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
BMALE‡ BFEM‡  PWMALE‡  PWFEM‡ 
Business Adm. & Economics  47 % **
 a 42
  %
a  40 %**  35 % 
Law 9  %***
 a 13
 %
a  29 %**  33 % 
Computer and System sc.   27 %***
 b 14  %
 a  17 %***  10 % 
Personnel Management  4 %***
 a 10  %
 a  2 %**  7 % 
Social Science  13 %***  21 %
 a  11 %***  16 % 
Age  28.4*** 27.5 28.0*** 27.2 
No work experience  58 %***
 a 47  %
 a  68 %***  59 % 
Unqualified work experience  25 %***
 a 35  %
 a  20 %***  27 % 
Qualified work experience  17 %
 a 17  %
 b  12 %*  14 % 
Temporary†    22 %***
 a 35  %
 a  40 %***  48 % 
Trainee 10  %***
 a 7  %
 a  16 %  15 % 
Metropolitan ††    69 %  66 %
 a  67 %***  61 % 
Search < 1 month‡  45 %***  40 %  52 %***  47 % 
Search 1-3 months  16 %  15 %  19 %  21 % 
Search 3-6 months  14 %  14 %  13 %  13 % 
Search 6-9 months  9 %***  14 %  8 %  9 % 
Search > 9 months  15 %*  17 %  8 %**  10 % 
Applied 1-5 jobs‡‡    53 %*  48 %  63 %  60 % 
Applied 6-20 jobs  29 %  27 %  24 %  26 % 
Applied 21-50 jobs  12 %**  17 %  9 %  9 % 
Applied >50 jobs  6 %  8 %  4 %  5 % 
No  of  obs    901 1222 812 1030 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. ‡ “B” refers to those choosing a job involving 
individual wage bargaining and “PW” refers to those choosing a job with a posted wage. ***/**/* 
denote statistical gender differences at the 1/5/10 percent levels respectively in a t-test of equal 
variance. a/b/c denote statistical difference between bargainers and non-bargainers at the 1/5/10 
percent levels respectively. † Employment contracts are permanent or temporary (trial period, project 
basis or substitute contract.). ††. Metropolitan areas: Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. ‡ Search <1 
month includes individuals who got job prior to graduation, who returned to same employer as before 
studying, and those who searched for less than a month. ‡‡ Only available for 1999.  
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TABLE 3 REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE STANDARD MINCER MODEL FOR THE WAGE 
BID AND WAGE OFFERS, SEPARATED BY GENDER 
  Wage Bid    Wage Offer   
Sample  B B  1999  ALL  B  PW 
Female -0.029***  -0.035***  -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.026*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Law -0.012  -0.013  -0.038***  -0.012  -0.035*** 
  (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Computer  &  Sys.  Scien  0.051*** 0.033*** 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.079*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) 
Personnel Man.  -0.028***  -0.039** -0.022**  -0.021*  -0.037** 
  (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) 
Social  Science  -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.038***  -0.024** 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) 
Unqual. Work Exper.
  0.024*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.037***  0.013* 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Qualif. Work Exper.  0.087***    0.104***  0.113***  0.075*** 
 (0.009)    (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Age  0.014*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Governmental Sector  -0.039***  -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.040*** -0.036*** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Municipal Sector  -0.031***  -0.037***  -0.019** -0.024** -0.033** 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) 
Temporary contr.   -0.023***  -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.034*** 
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Trainee 0.008  0.019  -0.008  0.007  -0.006 
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) 
Metropolitan Area
  0.060*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.059*** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Survey  2000  0.042***    0.045*** 0.033*** 0.055*** 
 (0.006)    (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Search  1-3  months  -0.017**  -0.016     
  (0.008)  (0.011)     
Search  3-6  months -0.010  -0.003     
  (0.009)  (0.013)     
Search  6-9  months -0.003  0.011     
  (0.010)  (0.014)     
Search >9 months  0.036***  0.046***       
  (0.009)  (0.013)     
Applied  6-20  Jobs   -0.039***      
   (0.009)      
Applied 21-50 Jobs    -0.042***       
   (0.011)      
Applied >50  Jobs    -0.060***       
   (0.015)      
Constant 10.741***  10.704***  10.497*** 10.657*** 10.071*** 
  (0.069) (0.098) (0.056) (0.072) (0.084) 
R-squared  0.313 0.306 0.323 0.309 0.307 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.307 0.293 0.320 0.304 0.302 
F-value 53.207  23.307  134.416  67.182  57.828 
No  of  obs.    2123 1022 3965 2123 1842 
Note: Standard errors are in italics. All values are in SEK. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1/5/10 
percent levels respectively. B” refers to those choosing a job involving individual wage bargaining and “PW”
refers to those choosing a job with a posted wage. For a variable description see Table II. 
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TABLE 4 DECOMPOSING THE GENDER WAGE GAP IN OFFERED WAGES FOR 
THOSE WITH A JOB REQUIRING WAGE BARGAINING  AND THOSE WITH A 
POSTED-WAGE JOB 
 T HE MALE-FEMALE 
WAGE GAP 
EXPLAINED BY DIFFERENCES  IN: 
 
   ( I) 
CHARACTERISTICS
(II) THE RETURN TO 
CHARACTERISTICS
 
F M W W ln ln −  
 
) ( F M M X X − β  
[ ] ) ( M F F X X − β  
) ( F M F X β β −  
[] ) ( M F M X β β −  
THE MINCER MODEL FOR 
“POSTED-WAGE JOBS”













‡ Estimates follow from estimations reported in Appendix Table I, columns 1 and 2. 
‡‡ Estimates follow from estimations reported in Appendix Table I, columns 3 and 4. 
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TABLE 5 THE DISTRIBUTION OF OVERBIDDING OR SELF-PROMOMTING 
BARGAINING STRATEGY  
 ALL    MALE  FEMALE 
      
OVERBID
◊  1.008 1.024***  0.996*** 
 (0.131)  (0.146)  (0.116) 
OVERBID < 1  0.924  0.925  0.924 
 (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.056) 
share 0.54  0.51  0.57 
OVERBID > 1  1.108  1.130***  1.090*** 
 (0.123)  (0.137)  (0.107) 
share 0.46  0.49***  0.43*** 
OVERBID|F 
◊ ◊  1.008 1.011***  1.027 
 (0.130)  (0.144)  (0.122) 
OVERBID|F < 1  0.925  0.920**  0.928** 
 (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.055) 
Share 0.55  0.56  0.53 
OVERBID|F > 1  1.108  1.129***  1.094*** 
 (0.121)  (0.137)  (0.108) 
share 0.45  0.44*  0.47* 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. ***/**/* denote a statistically significant 
gender difference at the 1/5/10 percent levels respectively. ◊ OVERBID is defined as the ratio of 
the wage bid and a reference wage bid predicted for each individual using the same controls as in 
Table III column 1, except for the gender dummy. 
◊◊ OVERBID|F is defined as the ratio of the 
wage bid and a reference wage bid predicted for each individual using the same controls as in 
Table III column 1 including the gender dummy   32
 
TABLE 6  REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE WAGE BARGAINING 











TH QUANTILE OLS 
OVERBID 0.808***  0.943***  1.047***
 A 0.936*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
FEM*OVERBID 0.035  -0.052** -0.083***
 A -0.050** 
 (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
FEMALE -0.038  0.043*  0.082***
 A 0.044* 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.181***  0.096***  0.022
 A 0.094*** 
 (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Pseudo R-sq  0.3884  0.4628  0.5455   
R-squared     0.727 
Adj-R-squared       0.726 
F-value       1879.51 
p-value       0.000 
No of Obs.  2123  2123  2123  2123 
Note: Standard errors are in italics. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels 
respectively. 
A indicates a statistically significant difference between the 75
th and 25
th quantile at the 1 
percent level. The dependent variable is the bargaining success defined as the ratio of the offered wage 
and a predicted reference wage offer, using the same control variables as in Table III, column 3 except 
for the gender dummy. OVERBID is defined as the ratio of the wage bid and a reference wage bid 
predicted for each individual using the same controls as in Table III column 1, except for the gender 
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TABLE 7  REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE WAGE BARGAINING 
















QUANTILE  OLS 
OVERBID|F 0.806***  0.946***  1.044***
 A 0.937*** 
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
FEM* OVERBID|F  0.045*  -0.061**  -0.079***
 A -0.053** 
 (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
FEMALE -0.047*  0.052**  0.077***
 A 0.048* 
 (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.183***  0.093***  0.026
 A 0.093*** 
 (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Pseudo R-sq  0.3861  0.4603  0.5395   
R-squared       0.723 
Adj-R-squared       0.722 
F-value      1840.715 
p-value       0.000 
No of Obs.  2123  2123  2123  2123 
Note: Standard errors are in italics. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels 
respectively. 
A indicates a statistically significant difference between the 75
th and 25
th quantile at the 1 
percent level. The dependent variable is the bargaining success defined as the ratio of the offered wage 
and a predicted reference wage offer, using the same control variables as in Table III, column 3 
including the gender dummy. OVERBID|F is defined as the ratio of the wage bid and a reference wage 
bid predicted for each individual using the same controls as in Table III column 1, including the gender 
dummy.    
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TABLE 8  REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE SUCCESS OF THE WAGE BARGAINING 















TH QUANT OLS 
 WOMEN  WOMEN  WOMEN  WOMEN  MEN  MEN  MEN  MEN 
OVERBID|F 0.851***  0.885***  0.965***
 A 0.884*** 0.806*** 0.946*** 1.044***
 A 0.937***
 (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.018) 
Constant  0.136*** 0.145*** 0.103***  0.141*** 0.183*** 0.093***  0.026  0.093***
 (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
Ps. R-sq  0.3856 0.4389 0.5056    0.3854 0.4840  0.5733   
R-sq      0.697       0.744 
Adj  Rsq      0.696       0.744 
F-value      2802.526       2618.993
p-value      0.000      0 
No of Obs.  1222  1222  1222  1222  901  901  901  901 
Note: Standard errors are in italics.***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels respectively. 
A indicates a statistically significant difference between the 75
th and 25
th quantile at the 1 percent level. 
OVERBID|F is defined as the ratio of the wage bid and a reference wage bid predicted for each individual using 
the same controls as in Table III column 1, including the gender dummy.      
 




APPENDIX TABLE I REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE STANDARD MINCER MODEL FOR 
THE WAGE OFFERS USED IN THE OAXACA-BLINDER DECOMPOSITION 
 Bargaining  Posted  Wage 
Sample  Male Female Male Female 
Law -0.004  -0.013  -0.010  -0.048*** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
Computer & Sys. Scien  0.045***  0.084***  0.075***  0.088*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Personnel Man.  -0.063***  -0.007  0.020  -0.056*** 
  (0.024) (0.012) (0.034) (0.016) 
Social Science  -0.045***  -0.028***  0.005  -0.035*** 
  (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) 
Unqual. Work Exper.
  0.056*** 0.026*** 0.033***  -0.000 
  (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) 
Qualif.  Work  Exper.  0.148*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.051*** 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
Age 0.012***  0.013***  0.002  0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Governmental Sector  -0.052***  -0.030***  -0.068***  -0.017* 
  (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) 
Municipal Sector  -0.024  -0.022*  -0.029  -0.028 
  (0.021) (0.012) (0.032) (0.018) 
Temporary contr.   -0.035***  -0.021***  -0.041***  -0.026*** 
  (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
Trainee -0.025*  0.038***  -0.020  0.007 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Metropolitan Area
  0.077*** 0.068*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Survey  2000  0.018  0.044*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant  10.599***  10.640*** 9.837*** 10.208*** 
  (0.126) (0.086) (0.138) (0.104) 
R-squared  0.292 0.299 0.313 0.288 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.282 0.291 0.302 0.279 
F-value  28.185 39.640 27.952 31.611 
No of obs.   901  1222  812  1030 
Note: Standard errors are in italics. All values are in SEK. For variable definition see Table II. ***/**/* denote 
statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels respectively.   36
 
 
Appendix A: The Oaxaca Blinder Wage Decomposition 
Let  M W ln  be the natural logarithm monthly mean wage for men and  F W ln  be the equivalent for 
women. Further, let  M X  and  F X  denote the mean values of the characteristics used as 
explanatory variables and let  M β  and  F β  denote the slope coefficients of the male and female 
wage equations respectively. The wage gap can then be written as 
( ) ( ) ∑ ∑ − + − = − F M F F M M F M X X X W W β β β ln ln ,   [2] 
            (i)      (ii)          (iii)    
where first term (i) equals the male-female wage differential in log wages. The second term (ii) 
is the share of the wage gap which can be credited to differences in the mean values of the 
explanatory variables. The final and third term (iii) is the share of the wage gap that is credited to 
different returns connected with those characteristics or variables (i.e. measurable and seemingly 
identical characteristics). It is this final term that is assumed to be ascribable to discrimination.
18 
                                                           
18 There are two limitations to this decomposition and the extent to which the third term can be assumed to reflect 
discrimination. First, a crucial element for dividing the decomposition into one non-discriminatory (explained) and 
one discriminatory (unexplained) part, is that all productivity-related aspects that affect wages have to be included in 
the wage equation. Second, the slope coefficients used in the decomposition ought to have a significant impact on 
the wages. Both of the above conditions are hard to fulfill, which means that the results should be analyzed with this 
shortcoming in mind. Moreover, two other points should be made. If identical characteristics do not yield the same 
return, this cannot always be ascribed to discrimination (Goldin and Polachek, 1987). Moreover, differences in 
characteristics may in their turn be due to discrimination. 